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BANK MERGERS: AGENCY REVIEW AND
THE CHANGING LINE OF COMMERCE
I. Introduction
Since the early days of our Nation, there has been a divergence of
views on the merits of competition in the commercial banking field.1
1. See S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-18 (1959) (Senate Report on the
regulation of bank mergers).
In 1790, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton presented a plan for a
national financial policy to the House of Representatives. Hamilton was the first to
recognize the modern functions of a central bank. He foresaw a national, as well as
an extra-large bank, leading to a uniform paper currency, government control of
monetary policy and minimization of the risk of banking abuses. R. TIMBERLAKE, THE
ORIGINS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 4-6 (1978).
The bill to charter the First Bank of the United States (First Bank) was passed by
Congress in 1791. However, the First Bank's charter was not renewed in 1811 due to
political opposition. The opposition was led by agrarians and businessmen who were
against the First Bank's regulatory power over state banks. Note, Federal Control
Over the Money Market, 1981 ARiz. ST. L.J. 159, 166 & n.58.
Due to (1) heavy borrowing by the government necessitated by the War of 1812
and (2) the flood of paper money issued by the state banks, which was far in excess of
what could be reasonably redeemed in specie, the Second Bank of the United States
(Second Bank) was created in 1816. Note, supra, at 167. Under Nicholas Biddle, who
became the president of the Second Bank in 1823, the central banking concept
emerged. R. TIMBERLAKE, supra, at 28, 31. The demise of the Second Bank was again
due to political reasons, as its constitutionality was made a presidential campaign
issue in 1828. Andrew Jackson used opposition to the bank as one of his platforms.
Note, supra, at 168-69.
After the Second Bank's charter lapsed in 1836, there was a period of economic
chaos. The depression of 1837 was a direct result of the Second Bank's demise. Note,
supra, at 169. From 1836 to 1863, this Nation witnessed an era of state, or free,
banking. Many states enacted laws setting minimum qualifications to form banks, id.
at 169-70, making it relatively simple to open a bank and issue bank notes. Hale,
Mergers of Financial Institutions, 21 Bus. LAW. 211-12 (1965). The number of state
banks grew from 713 in 1836 to 1,601 in 1861. Note, supra, at 170.
In 1864, Congress passed the National Bank Act (1864 Act). Act of June 3, 1864,
ch. 106, § 5, 13 Stat. 100. This bill was a compromise to resolve the differences
between the monopolistic Bank of the United States and the financial insecurity of
free banking. Kintner & Hansen, A Review of the Law of Bank Mergers, 14 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 213-14 (1972). The 1864 Act provided for the establishment
of nationally-chartered banks to be approved and regulated by the Comptroller of
the Currency. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, §§ 1, 12, 16-18, 20, 13 Stat. 99, 102, 104-
05. Coupled with the revival of the state banking system, the passage of the 1864 Act
led to the creation of today's dual banking system. Hale, supra, at 212.
The Federal Reserve Act, Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, which
established the Federal Reserve System in 1913, was a compromise between propo-
nents of public control, who feared the establishment of a central bank controlled by
a privileged few, and central banking proponents, who feared that government
control would lead to political control. Note, supra, at 175-76. The Act provides for a
decentralized system of 12 Federal Reserve Banks in different parts of the country
under joint supervision by both the private and public sectors. Id. at 176.
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During the late 1950's and early 1960's, this dichotomy of views
focused on the applicability of federal antitrust laws2 to bank mer-
gers.3 Because of congressional vacillation in the area, 4 the Depart-
ment of Justice has taken the initiative in challenging proposed bank
mergers which do not satisfy the antitrust criteria of the Sherman5 and
Clayton Acts.6
A challenge to a proposed bank merger may come in the form of a
civil suit charging a violation of either section 1 of the Sherman Act 7
or section 7 of the Clayton Act,8 both of which prohibit anticompeti-
tive mergers. Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes any "contract,
combination, . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce"
illegal." Section 7 of the Clayton Act' 0 prohibits any corporation from
acquiring the stock of another corporation, or the assets of another
corporation if the acquiring entity is subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission" (FTC), "where in any line of commerce
2. The conflict centered on the applicability of the Sherman Act, currently
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), and the Clayton Act, currently codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), to bank mergers. See S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2, 19-21 (1959).
3. See S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, 19-21 (1959).
4. See note 30 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the vagueness
inherent in the Bank Merger Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (amended
1966).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). The Sherman Act prohibits any contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce. Id. § 1. Section 2 of the
Sherman Act provides that any person who monopolizes, attempts to monopolize, or
combines or conspires with any other person to monopolize any part of trade or
commerce is guilty of a felony. Id. § 2.
6. Id. §§ 12-27. The Clayton Act prohibits any acquisition which substantially
lessens competition or tends to create a monopoly. Id. § 18.
7. Id. § 1.
8. Id. § 18.
9. Id. § 1.
10. Id. § 18.
11. In 1934, the Supreme Court severely curtailed the antitrust efforts of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). By interpreting the phrase "substantial lessening
of competition" differently from the FTC, the Court limited the Commission's
regulatory power to mergers through pure stock acquisitions. See Arrow-Hart &
Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934). From 1930 to 1950, the FTC had
almost no role to play in the determination of anticompetitive effects of mergers
consummated via asset acquisition. This asset acquisition loophole was finally closed
when the Celler-Kefauver amendments to § 7 were passed in 1950. Act of Dec. 29,
1950, ch. 1184, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1976)). D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 257-58 (1959); Austin, The
Evolution of Commercial Bank Merger Antitrust Law, 36 Bus. LAW. 297-98 (1981).
Historically, banks have almost always merged via asset acquisition. Kintner &
Hansen, supra note 1, at 218. However, the FTC, under § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, has no jurisdiction over banks. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1976). Thus,
commercial banks were exempt from § 7 of the Clayton Act until § 11 gave the
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. . .in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition ...
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly." 12 The "line of commerce" refers to the relevant product
market in which the merging firms are engaged. It is determined by
the nature of the commercial entities involved, that is, the cluster of
products and services which they offer, and by the nature of the
competition which they face.' 3 The purpose of defining the line of
commerce is to provide a basis for measuring the effects of a proposed
combination on competition. 4
The Justice Department's main attack against proposed bank mer-
gers has been based on the economic theory of actual competition.' 5
Actual competition describes the competitive effect firms operating in
the same geographic market and the same line of commerce exert on
each other.16 By applying the economic theory of actual competition
and the general antitrust criteria set out in the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, and by defining the line of commerce as commercial banking,
the Department of Justice, as of 1981, succeeded in enjoining or
otherwise thwarting every horizontal bank merger it has challenged. 17
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) the power to apply it to banks. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a)
(1976). All doubts concerning the applicability of § 7 to commercial banks were
finally laid to rest in Transamerica Corp. v. FRB, 206 F.2d 163, 165 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953), where the Third Circuit, in setting aside the Federal
Reserve Board's order that a banking corporation must divest itself of stock held in
other independent commercial banks, held that § 7 of the Clayton Act applied to
bank mergers. After Transamerica, however, the issue of whether the Justice Depart-
ment may use § 7 to contest bank mergers remained open.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
13. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 360 (1970)
(merger between two banks in a small community held to violate § 7 of the Clayton
Act).
14. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 457 (1964) (merger
between the second largest producer of metal containers and the third largest pro-
ducer of glass containers held to violate § 7 of the Clayton Act as the competition
protected by § 7 is not limited to that between identical products). The broader the
line of commerce is defined, the more permissive acquisition policy will be and the
likelihood of finding substantially adverse competitive effects under the antitrust
laws will be reduced. Bleier & Eisenbeis, Commercial Banking as the "Line of
Commerce" and the Role of Thrifts, 98 BANKING L.J. 374, 386 (1981).
15. Austin, supra note 11, at 333-34.
16. Id. Thus, if the Justice Department finds that a combination between two or
more firms directly competing in the same geographic market and the same line of
commerce violates either § 1 of the Sherman Act or § 7 of the Clayton Act, it will
bring suit.
17. Austin, supra note 11, at 363. See, e.g., United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S.
171 (1968) (merger between second and fourth largest banks in Davidson County,
Tennessee, held to violate § 7 of the Clayton Act); United States v. First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964) (merger between largest and fourth largest banks in
Fayette County, Kentucky, held to violate § 7 of the Clayton Act).
1982]
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The standards currently applied by the Justice Department to review
the propriety of a proposed merger do not strictly conform, however,
to those standards most recently promulgated by Congress for the
banking industry. 18
These conflicting criteria have caused confusion among the bank
regulatory agencies and within the banking industry with respect to
two important issues: (1) whether the antitrust laws should be applied
to bank mergers within the vacuum of Justice Department analysis or
whether there should be a greater emphasis on agency participation in
reviewing proposed mergers, and (2) whether commercial banking
should continue as the relevant line of commerce when antitrust
standards are applied.
II. Judicial Construction of the Bank Merger Acts
During the 1950's, there was a perceived inability by the Federal
government to act under existing antitrust law 9 and control the
alarming number of bank mergers. 20 As a result, 21 Congress enacted
18. The Bank Merger Act of 1966 established uniform standards to be applied by
the courts, the Department of Justice, and the bank regulatory agencies. For a
discussion of the Bank Merger Act of 1966, see notes 40-48 infra and accompanying
text (original version at ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914)).
19. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), discussed in text accompanying notes 31-38 infra, the
Department of Justice recognized that it had no jurisdiction under § 7 of the Clayton
Act to enjoin asset acquisitions by banks. 374 U.S. at 377-78. See also Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 1030
(1957) (study of banking law) (statement by Attorney General Brownell recognizing
that asset acquisitions by banks were not covered by § 7 of the Clayton Act).
Although the Sherman Act could have been used to enjoin most mergers, its
application was made difficult after the Supreme Court set forth the broad "rule of
reason" test in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (combination of
oil companies held to violate the Sherman Act since it constituted an unreasonable
and undue restraint of trade), and United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495
(1948) (acquisition by U.S. Steel of another steel corporation held not to violate the
Sherman Act). In both cases, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act prohib-
ited only unreasonable restraints, and not all possible restraints of trade. Columbia
Steel, 334 U.S. at 522; Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 60. The Government never
brought suit to enjoin a bank merger under this Act until 1959 in United States v.
Firstamerica Corp., No. 38139 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 928
(1960) (§ 11 of the Clayton Act does not give the bank regulatory agencies exclusive
jurisdiction over bank mergers).
20. See HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK MERGERS AND CONSOLI-
DATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1995, 1996 (House of Representatives Report accompanying the
Bank Merger Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (1960) (amended 1966),
discussed in notes 22-30 infra and accompanying text, setting forth the purpose and
legislative history of the Act).
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the Bank Merger Act of 196022 (BMA-60). The bill was introduced to
provide restrictions against mergers and consolidations of federally
insured banks.2 3 One faction wanted to extend the reach of the anti-
trust statutes to include banks. 24 The opposing faction, led by the
banking industry, favored special interest legislation to insulate com-
mercial banks from the antitrust laws.
25
Under BMA-60, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency (OCC) were each given approval power over
certain types of mergers.26 In addition to determining the competitive
effects2 7 of a proposed merger, the agencies were required to consider
six other factors including: (1) the financial history and condition of
each of the banks involved; (2) the adequacy of its capital structure;
(3) its future earnings prospects; (4) the general character of its man-
agement; (5) the convenience and needs of the community to be
served; and (6) whether the bank's corporate powers are consistent
with the purpose of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 28 Although as
21. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK MERGERS AND CONSOLIDA-
TIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1995, 1996-98.
22. Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (1960) (amended 1966).
23. 105 CONG. REC. 2283 (1959); HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK
MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, re-
printed in 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1995, 1995.
24. Whitesell & Kamens, Bank Expansion: The Politics of Supreme Court Deci-
sions, 91 BANKING L.J. 748, 751 (1974). This faction was led by the Department of
Justice and Congressman Celler, who was Chairman of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee. See Regulation of Bank Mergers, 1959: Hearings on S. 1062 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13, 86 (1959) (hearings
on a bill to provide safeguards against mergers and consolidations of banks which
might violate the antitrust laws).
25. The bankers' position was in response to the decision in United States v.
Firstamerica Corp., No. 38139 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 928
(1960), which held that § 11 of the Clayton Act did not give the bank regulatory
agencies exclusive jurisdiction over bank mergers. Austin, supra note 11, at 299.
26. The FRB was given jurisdiction if the merger resulted in a state bank which is
a member of the Federal Reserve System; if the merger resulted in an insured
nonmember state bank, the FDIC had jurisdiction; if the merger resulted in a
national bank or a District of Columbia bank, the OCC was given approval author-
ity. Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (1960) (amended 1966).
27. The competitive factor was the effect of the proposed merger on competition,
including any tendency toward monopoly. Id.
28. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK MERGERS AND CONSOLIDA-
TIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1995, 1995.
Congress ruled out the notion that competitive factors should be controlling and,
instead, opted for this balanced approach. Hale, supra note 1, at 213. For a further
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originally drafted the legislation was thought by many to grant exclu-
sive jurisdiction over approval of bank mergers to the bank regulatory
agencies,2 9 the bill's opponents succeeded in moderating the final
language of the bill enough to leave the jurisdictional question open to
judicial interpretation. 30 The first opportunity for Supreme Court
interpretation of BMA-60 was presented in the landmark case of
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank31 (PNB).
In PNB, the Philadelphia National Bank and the Girard Coin Ex-
change Trust Company, the second and third largest banks in Phila-
delphia, sought to merge. If consummated, the resulting bank would
have been Philadelphia's largest. Although the OCC approved the
merger, 32 the Department of Justice filed suit to enjoin it. Among the
issues presented was whether section 7 of the Clayton Act was applica-
discussion of the events and circumstances leading up to the passage of BMA-60 and
its legislative history, see Wu & Connell, Merger Myopia: An Economic View of
Supreme Court Decisions on Bank Mergers, 59 VA. L. REV. 860, 862-63 (1973); Note,
A Legislative History of the 1960 Bank Merger Act and Its 1966 Amendment: Judicial
Misuse and a Suggested Approach, 44 IND. L.J. 596 (1969).
Neither BMA-60 nor its successor, BMA-66, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976), covers
bank holding companies (BHCs). Congress passed the Bank Holding Company Act
(BHCA), ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-
1843, 1849 (1976)), in 1956 and gave the FRB regulatory control over BHCs. BHCs
began to merge and the BHCA had to be amended in 1970 to provide for regulatory
control. Although discussion of BHCs is beyond the scope of this Comment, it should
be noted that the competitive standards written into the BHCA in 1970 are identical
to those in BMA-66. See notes 44-46 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the competitive standards of BMA-66. See also County Nat'l Bancorp. v. FRB, 654
F.2d 1253, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981) (order denying the acquisition by a BHC of another
BHC vacated as the FRB considered anticompetitive factors which were more strin-
gent than those mandated in the BHCA); S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9,
10, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2385, 2393-94 (bill to amend the
BHCA of 1956).
29. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 383 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1959); 106 CONG.
REC. 7257 (1960); Note, supra note 28, at 604, 608.
30. See Kintner & Hansen, supra note 1, at 222, 225. For instance, the role the
Justice Department was to play with respect to approvals or denials of bank mergers
was never clearly spelled out in BMA-60. While such authority was placed in the
hands of the regulatory agencies, BMA-60 also provided that the reviewing agency
shall request a report on the competitive factors from the Attorney General. How-
ever, the exact weight to be given to the Attorney General's report was not discussed.
See Bank Merger Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (amended 1966).
31. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
32. The OCC found that the merger would be in the public interest. See letter
from H.S. Haggard, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, to Frederic A. Potts,
president of the Philadelphia National Bank (Feb. 28, 1961) (confirming the Comp-
troller's decision of Feb. 24, 1961). The Comptroller's decision was orally conveyed
to Mr. Potts in a telephone conversation, but apparently, no-formal decision was
prepared. Letter from Marie Giblin, Communications Division, Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency (Nov. 15, 1982).
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ble to bank mergers.33 The Court held that the proposed consolidation
would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act and issued a permanent
injunction to enjoin the merger.3 4 Disregarding the mitigating fac-
tors35 set out in BMA-60, 36 the Court announced that the relevant line
of commerce was commercial banking.3 7 In addition, the Court did
not interpret BMA-60 as a grant to the banking agencies of exclusive
jurisdiction over merger approvals. 38
Dissatisfied with the Supreme Court's interpretation of BMA-60,
39
Congress enacted the Bank Merger Act of 196640 (BMA-66) to amend
33. The Department of Justice contended that the proposed merger would violate
§ 7 of the Clayton Act. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348,
351 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). However, the merging banks argued
that the OCC's decision to approve the merger was final and that BMA-60 precluded
a review of the proposed merger under antitrust laws. Id. at 355-56.
34. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 355-72.
35. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
36. Referring to the legislative history of BMA-60, Justice Harlan noted that:
"Time and again it was repeated that effect on competition was not to be the
controlling factor in determining whether to approve a bank merger, that a merger
could be approved as being in the public interest even though it would cause a
substantial lessening of competition." Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 382
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
37. The Court found that commercial banks furnish products and services vhich
are unique, cost advantageous, and enjoy settled consumer preference and that these
factors suffice to insulate commercial banks from competition from other sources. An
example of such products and services include demand deposits (checking accounts)
and various kinds of credit. Id. at 356.
38. Prior to BMA-60, the Department of Justice considered banks exempt from
antitrust laws due .to their regulated status. Comment, Bank Mergers and Potential
Competition, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 767, 769 (1975). Henceforth, the Justice Depart-
ment brought several more suits under the Sherman and Clayton Acts in the Supreme
Court to enjoin horizontal bank mergers. It was successful in every such case. See
note 17 supra. The Department of Justice's success rate has transformed its advisory
role into one which is vested with an indirect power to approve. See notes 92 & 94-96
infra and accompanying text.
39. Senator Robertson, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Commit-
tee, and a principal author of BMA-60, remarked that the PNB decision did not come
close to reflecting congressional intent. 109 CONG. REC. 11,097 (1963). Senator
Robertson noted that the amendment to BMA-60
will end the confusion and controversy which has surrounded the bank
merger situation since the ill-advised and unfortunate decisions of the
Supreme Court in Philadelphia [PNB] and Lexington [United States v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964)] cases and the district
court decision in the New York case [United States v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), discussed at note
62 infra] which followed these precedents. . . . [BMA-66] will strike the
Philadelphia, Lexington, and New York decisions and opinions from the
books.
112 CONG. REC. 2652 (1966). See United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171,
177 (1968).
40. S. 1698, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. REc. 6919 (1965) (presently codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976)).
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BMA-60. A principal motive for enacting BMA-66 was to clarify the
extent to which the antitrust laws could be applied to bank mergers. 41
One congressional faction asserted that banking is a unique industry
which requires special expertise in determining where the public in-
terest lies in a given bank merger situation, and that once a merger is
approved by the appropriate agency, it should be immune from anti-
trust scrutiny. 42 Opponents of this view argued that banking should
not be treated differently from other industries when deciding ques-
tions of competition and that the public interest is not a mitigating
factor to be considered. 43
:BMA-66 established a single set of standards to be applied by the
regulatory agencies, the Department of Justice and the courts under
the antitrust laws. 44 These standards are stricter than those provided
in BMA-60. 45 Moreover, in addition to considering the effects of a
merger on competition, BMA-66 also mandates that courts must
weigh the convenience and needs of the community served by the
merging firms. 46 If the proposed merger was approved by one of the
regulatory agencies, its consummation was stayed for thirty days to
41. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK MERGERS-REVIEW PROCE-
DUPE, H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1860, 1861. Congress passed BMA-66 to alter the procedures by
which the Justice Department would challenge bank mergers and alter the legal
standard which courts use in judging those mergers. United States v. Third Nat'l
Bank, 390 U.S. at 177.
42. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK MERGERS-REVIEW PROCE-
DURE, H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1860, 1861.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1860, 1860. "The bill
[BMA-66] would establish a single set of standards for the consideration of future
mergers by the banking supervisory agencies, the Department of Justice, and the
courts under the antitrust laws .... " Essentially, this single set of standards is the
effect of the proposed bank merger on competition and on the convenience and needs
of the community to be served. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1976).
45. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK MERGERs-REVIEW PROCE-
DURE, H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1860. Unlike BMA-60, BMA-66 incorporates language from the
Sherman and Clayton Acts in § 5 to measure the competitive effects of the merger.
Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1976) with Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (1960)
(amended 1966), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), and id. § 18.
46. See HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK MERGERS-REVIEW PRo-
CEDURE, H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1860, 1860, 1863. For examples of what constitutes "convenience
and needs to the community," see United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 301 F. Supp.
1161, 1210-20 (S.D. Miss. 1969). Some of these factors include the offering of trust
services, student loans, and mortgages. Id.
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give the Justice Department an opportunity to enjoin it. After the
lapse of the thirty days, the merger was immune from further attack
under the antitrust laws,47 with the exception of suits filed under
section 2 of the Sherman Act. 48
In its first opportunity to construe BMA-66, the Supreme Court
held that the Justice Department could continue to challenge pro-
posed bank mergers under the Clayton Act, but must consider the
mitigating factors, which had been previously disregarded. In United
States v. First City National Bank 49 (FCNB), the Justice Department
had brought suit under section 7 of the Clayton Act to enjoin a merger
between the First City National Bank of Houston and the Southern
National Bank of Houston. The merger had been approved by the
OCC under the convenience and needs standard of BMA-66. 50 The
Court held that the Department of Justice could challenge a bank
merger using the Clayton Act because the basis of the action existed
under the antitrust laws and not under BMA-66. Thus, there was no
defect in the pleadings.5 1 The Court stated further that the conven-
ience and needs standard of BMA-66 serves only as a new defense or
justification to the merger's proponents.5 2 The onus of proving that the
merger would serve the convenience and needs of the community was
on the merging banks. 5
3
47. BMA-66 also: (1) exempted mergers consummated prior to the PNB decision
from the antitrust laws, except for § 2 of the Sherman Act; (2) exempted any merger
consummated after the PNB decision and before enactment of BMA-66 if no antitrust
suit had been filed against it; and (3) required the courts to use the new standards in
all cases brought under the antitrust laws after the PNB decision. HousE COMM. ON
BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK MERGERS-REVIEW PROCEDURE, H.R. REP. No. 1221,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1860,
1860-61.
48. See note 5 supra for the scope of § 2.
49. 386 U.S. 361 (1967). This case was decided along with a companion case,
United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank.
50. 386 U.S. at 364.
51. Id. at 363-64.
52. Id. at 363.
53. Id. at 366. In espousing the convenience and needs to the community test, the
Court felt that this defense was remotely related to the failing company doctrine. Id.
at 369. The failing company doctrine is a defense to an action brought under § 7 of
the Clayton Act. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). In Interna-
tional Shoe, the Supreme Court held that a corporation with depleted resources,
remote prospects of rehabilitation, and facing a grave possibility of business failure
with resulting loss to its shareholders and injury to the communities where its plants
were located, could be purchased by a competitor without violating the Clayton Act.
Id. at 301. However, the Court in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S.
131 (1969), gave a narrow interpretation to this defense. Citizen Publishing set forth
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III. Jurisdiction
A. Agency vs. Justice Department Review-Varying Standards
In light of Congress' expressed intent to provide uniform standards
for the approval or disapproval of bank mergers, the Justice Depart-
ment should not independently apply the antitrust laws to bank mer-
gers. It has been asserted that the regulatory agencies are more quali-
fied to judge the impact of mergers than the Department of Justice.5 4
One commentator has suggested that economic research to define the
relevant market area, which is used to determine the competitive
effects of a merger, should be performed by the regulatory agencies
and outside scholars, not by the Department of Justice. 55
Recent lower court decisions indicate that evidence produced by the
merging banks and relied upon by the bank regulatory agencies may
present a truer picture of the market and therefore be more relevant
than evidence produced by the Justice Department. For example, in
United States v. First National Bank, 56 the court had to use evidence
two requirements before this defense could be used. First, there had to be a grave
probability of business failure. Second, no other prospective purchasers must be
available. Id. at 137-38.
While FCNB decided the procedural issues of BMA-66, its substantive aspects were
decided in United States v. Third Nat'l Bank (TNB), 390 U.S. 171 (1968). In that
case, the second and fourth largest banks in Davidson County, Tennessee, sought to
merge, which would result in that county's largest bank. The Supreme Court held
that the merger tended to lessen competition and that the "convenience and needs" of
the merger did not outweigh its anticompetitive effects. In so holding, the Court
established a two-prong test for the "convenience and needs" defense: (1) Does the
merger violate the Clayton Act standard embodied in BMA-66? (2) If so, are the
anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger clearly outweighed in the public
interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and
needs of the community to be served? Id. at 181-82.
Although the Court rejected the Justice Department's contention that the conven-
ience and needs doctrine was a mere restatement of the failing company doctrine, it
narrowly defined the convenience and needs defense by holding that "before a
merger injurious to the public interest is approved, a showing [must] be made that
the gain expected from the merger cannot reasonably be expected through other
means." Id. at 190. Thus, the Court in TNB made the existence of "convenience and
needs" extremely difficult to establish. Whitesell & Kamens, supra note 24, at 760.
54. Comment, supra note 38, at 789. Judge MacMahon, who rendered the opin-
ion in United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (three-year old bank merger between the Manufacturers Trust
Company and the Hanover Bank held to violate both the Sherman and Clayton
Acts), also conceded that the banking agencies had more technical expertise. Id. at
880.
55. Austin, supra note 11, at 369.
56. 301 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Miss. 1969). The Justice Department sought to enjoin
the proposed merger between the second and fifteenth largest banks in Mississippi.
Id. at 1163. The district court held that the proposed merger would not have any
adverse or anticompetitive effects and that it met the convenience and needs of the
community to be served. Id. at 1230-31.
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produced by the defendants because the Government's witnesses were
never at the scene and, as a result, lacked first-hand knowledge of the
relevant product market and local customer preferences. 57 In United
States v. Crocker-Anglo National Bank,58 the court found that the
Department of Justice "relied on an expert who had absolutely no
familiarity with [market conditions in] the state of California and
who could not claim to be a financial expert." 59 The court in United
States v. Deposit Guaranty National Bank60 had to use evidence of-
fered by the acquiring bank since the merger guidelines adopted by
the Justice Department were not applicable."' In United States v.
Manufactureres Hanover Trust Co.62 (MHT), Judge MacMahon noted
that the Attorney General's report "was superficial and permeated
with erroneous assumptions of fact as well as errors of law."
'6 3
The evidence used by regulatory agencies includes data reflecting a
broader product market.6 4 After the PNB decision, the banking agen-
cies adhered to the Supreme Court's definition of the line of com-
merce. The FRB, however, has acknowledged recently that competi-
tion from thrifts is a factor to be considered when evaluating the
competitive effects of a proposed merger, especially in the northeast,
where thrifts are large and play a major role in providing financial
services.6 5 In 1980, the FRB approved at least two merger applications
involving actual competitors in which substantial thrift competition
57. Id. at 1182-83.
58. 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967). The district court found that the proposed
merger between the Crocker-Anglo National Bank of San Francisco and the Citizens
National Bank of Los Angeles did not violate BMA-66, the Sherman Act, or the
Clayton Act. Id. at 169, 200.
59. Id. at 171.
60. 373 F. Supp. 1230 (S.D. Miss. 1974). The defendant moved to set aside a
consent judgment which prohibited it from making an acquisition without the con-
sent of the Justice Department. Id. at 1230-31. The district court held that the
proposed acquisition constituted a foothold acquisition and thus was not precluded
by the prior consent decree. Id. at 1241.
61. Id. at 1238.
62. 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The Justice Department sought to divest a
three-year old bank merger, although the bank regulatory agencies and the New
York Superintendent of Banks had found that the merger would not have any adverse
competitive effects. Id. at 875-77. The district court held that the merger violated
both the Sherman and Clayton Acts and ordered the parties either to reach an
agreement regarding the undoing of the merger or, failing that, to submit to the
court for suitable relief. Id. at 956.
63. Id. at 884.
64. See Bleier & Eisenbeis, supra note 14, at 379; notes 65-75 infra and accompa-
nying text.
65. Bleier & Eisenbeis, supra note 14, at 379.
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was an important factor,6 6 and in 1981, three such applications were
approved.6 7
The FRB first treated thrifts as actual competitors in Fidelity Union
Bancorp.68 At that time, the FRB appeared to recognize that concen-
tration ratios based on commercial bank deposits alone are distorted
where thrifts have a significant influence in the market.6 9 On the day
Fidelity Union Bancorp. was decided, the FRB issued a letter70 to all
Federal Reserve Banks urging them to develop data on thrift competi-
tion where it might be relevant .7 Although the FRB has yet formally
66. Hawke, Competitive Factors: Review of 1980 Fed Decisions, Legal Times of
Wash., Feb. 23, 1981, at 26, col. 2. See The Bank of New York, 66 Fed. Res. Bull.
807 (1980) (merger between ninth and twenty-fourth largest banks in New York
approved by the FRB because the convenience and needs of the community to be
served by the merger outweighed the adverse competitive effects); Key Banks, Inc.,
66 Fed. Res. Bull. 781 (1980) (acquisition by a BHC of a commercial bank approved
by the FRB because its consummation would not significantly increase the concentra-
tion of commercial banking resources in New York).
67. See United Bank of New York, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 861 (1981) (acquisition by
the fifteenth largest banking organization in New York of the sixty-fifth largest bank
in New York approved by the FRB as the acquisition would not significantly increase
the concentration of banking resources in the state); Isabella Bank and Trust, 67 Fed.
Res. Bull. 866 (1981) (merger between the 102d and the 328th largest banks in
Michigan approved by the FRB because the consummation would not have an
appreciable effect on the concentration of banking in the state); United Bank Corp.,
67 Fed. Res. Bull. 358 (1981) (acquisition by the sixteenth largest banking organiza-
tion in New York of another commercial bank approved by the FRB because the
consummation would not result in a significant increase in the concentration of
banking resources in the state).
68. 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 576 (1980). In Fidelity Union Bancorp., a BHC applicant
sought to acquire the shares of the Garden State National Bank. Id. The FRB
approved the acquisition because competition from thrifts served to diminish the
adverse effects of the acquisition on banking structure and concentration in New
Jersey. In addition, the FRB found that the convenience and needs of the community
to be served outweighed any adverse competitive effects. Id. at 577-78.
69. Hawke, supra note 66, at 29, col. 3.
70. The letter conveyed instructions from the FRB that thrifts "should be included
in the overall competitive analysis in certain cases presented to the board" and that
while the emphasis to be accorded thrifts may "vary with the circumstances of each
case," it may be appropriate in some cases "that these institutions should be consid-
ered as basically equivalent to commercial banks." Letter from William W. Wiles,
Associate Director, Division of Banking Supervision Regulation, to all Federal Re-
serve Banks (June 25, 1980), partially reprinted in Hawke, supra note 66, at 29, col. 3
(emphasis added). The thrift competition argument fared better after the letter was
sent. Hawke, supra note 66, at 29, col. 4.
71. See, e.g., Republic of Texas Corp., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 57, 59 (1980) ("thrift
institutions in San Antonio compete sufficiently with commercial banks in the provi-
sion of financial services to customers that the competition afforded by thrift institu-
tions serves to reduce the adverse competitive effects associated with the merger of
these commercial banking organizations").
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to include thrifts in the product market,72 "[w]here ... thrifts can be
shown to be a significant competitive force, the board appears ...
prepared to take that fact into account in its qualitative analysis of the
market. " 7 3
Meanwhile, the OCC appears to have gone even further in recog-
nizing the presence and role of thrifts.7 4 In fact, both the OCC and the
FDIC have formally expanded the line of commerce to include thrifts
as full competitors of commercial banks in Maine. 75
B. Effect of Multi-Agency Review
Independent action by the Justice Department leads to confusion
among the banking agencies, and makes it difficult to reconcile the
Justice Department's reaction to the agencies' decisions. For instance,
in Southwest Mississippi Bank v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. ,76
the FDIC had approved a merger between the Southwest Mississippi
Bank and the Bank of McComb, despite an adverse report from the
FRB .77 However, when the FDIC later received adverse reports from
72. Hawke, supra note 66, at 34, col. 1.
73. Id. See, e.g., United Bank Corp. of New York, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 861, 862
(1981); Isabella Bank and Trust, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 866, 867 (1981); United Bank
Corp., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 358, 359 (1981).
74. See, e.g., Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on Application to
Merge Connecticut National Bank, Bridgeport, Fairfield County, Connecticut, into
Hartford National Bank and Trust Company, Hartford, Hartford County, Connecti-
cut, Mar. 26, 1982, at 2-5, 9-11.
75. Bleier & Eisenbeis, supra note 14, at 380 & nn. 13-14. At least two states in the
northeast have abolished the distinction between thrifts and commercial banks when
determining competitive effects. In New York, the Superintendent of Banks issued
Supervisory Policy G6 in 1979 to establish branching policy for banking organiza-
tions. Section 6.3 lumps thrifts and commercial banks together when determining
competition. [1979] 3 N.Y.C.R.R. § 6.3. On June 16, 1982, Massachusetts passed a
bill (ch. 155) to revise the laws governing state-chartered savings banks, cooperative
banks, and trust companies. Under the new law, all financial institutions would be
able to offer the same financial services by 1986, thus "razing regulatory barriers
between thrifts, commercial banks, and trust companies." Mass. Omnibus Bank Bill
is Law, 39 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 80 (July 12, 1982).
76. 499 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Miss. 1979), afJ'd, 625 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1980).
77. Id. at 4. The FDIC had assigned a field examiner to investigate the proposed
consolidation. The examiner found that the proposed merger would have a positive
effect on competition. Id. at 3. However, in the interim, the FRB sent the FDIC an
advisory opinion stating that the proposed merger would have adverse competitive
effects. Id. at 4. The plaintiffs then commissioned an economist experienced in
banking matters to evaluate the situation. Upon receipt of the economist's report, the
FDIC concurred with the field examiner's determination and approved the merger.
Id.
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the Attorney General and the OCC, it reversed its decision and disap-
proved the merger.7 8
In short, the regulatory agencies are forced to look over their shoul-
ders in anticipation of Justice Department preemption. 7 As a result,
the agencies have become so overly cautious that they are now apply-
ing standards which are stricter than those required under current
antitrust law. Hence, FRB decisions to disapprove mergers have been
reversed in the Eighth Circuit 0 and the Fifth Circuit;8 ' an FDIC
decision to disapprove a merger has been reversed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit. 2
The Justice Department's actions also lead to confusion within the
banking industry itself. Because the regulatory agencies have a
broader definition of the line of commerce, their views on the anti-
competitive effects of certain proposed mergers are at variance with
the Department of Justice. The Justice Department has failed to
recognize the significance in the congressional grant to the banking
agencies of responsibility for evaluating proposed bank mergers and of
power to approve or disapprove. Considering the short period of time
Congress gave to the Department of Justice to challenge an agency-
78. After the FDIC had approved the merger, it sent the economist's report to the
FRB, the OCC and the Attorney General. The FRB did not qualify its initial findings
or submit an amended report. The OCC and the Attorney General then submitted
their reports and they both found that the proposed merger would have a substantial
adverse effect on competition. Upon receipt of these reports, the FDIC reversed its
position and denied the merger application. Id. at 4-5.
79. Austin, supra note 11, at 326. Hence, the Justice Department's advisory report
became required reading for the regulatory agencies and the subject of dissection and
analysis by the agencies to determine the exact position of the Justice Department.
Id.
80. County Nat'l Bancorp. v. FRB, 654 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1981) (order by FRB
denying application of a BHC to acquire control of another bank vacated because the
FRB considered anticompetitive factors which were more stringent than those re-
quired under the BHCA).
81. Republic of Texas Corp. v. FRB, 649 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1981) (decision of
FRB to reject a BHA's application to acquire a commercial bank remanded because
the FRB failed to make adequate findings).
82. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1973) (decision
by FDIC to withhold approval of proposed consolidation of two thrift institutions
enjoined because the FDIC used an anticompetitive standard which was more strin-
gent that the antitrust laws).
The FDIC, especially, has a reputation for being highly restrictive in the bank
merger area and its standards have occasionally gone beyond the bounds of existing
antitrust law. Fischer, Geographic Markets under the Microscope: The Proximity
Theory Fails a Test, 98 BANKING L.J. 463, 467 (1981). See generally Metzger &
Greenfield, Agency Discretion to Deny Bank Mergers: What are the Limits? 98
BANKING L.J. 838 (1981), for a discussion of the broad, discretionary powers of the
bank regulatory agencies to deny bank mergers.
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approved merger, it is reasonable to assume that, at the very least,
Congress intended the banking agencies to have a substantial advisory
role in evaluating the competitive effects of a proposed merger.83
Because of its highly regulated nature, banking is often regarded as
a unique industry requiring the application of special guidelines.
84
Yet, while the banking agencies are attempting to conform their
regulations to these guidelines by adopting the convenience and needs
test, the Department of Justice continues to apply general antitrust
standards as defined under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 85
Justice Department preemption is likely to lead to inefficient, dupli-
cative review. For example, in MHT, 8 the FDIC, the OCC and the
New York Superintendent of Banks submitted reports to the FRB in
favor of a proposed merger between the Manufacturers Trust Com-
pany and the Hanover Bank. 7 Despite opposition from the Justice
Department, the FRB gave final approval.8 The Justice Department,
using different criteria to measure the adverse competitive effects,
challenged and successfully blocked the merger. 89
83. Thus, the agencies and the Justice Department are applying inconsistent
antitrust standards. Generally, the regulatory agencies tend to be more lenient. For
instance, the regulatory agencies approved 97.7% of the over-1600 merger applica-
tions they received during the 1960's. Comment, supra note 38, at 790-91. Mean-
while, the Justice Department found adverse competitive effects in 59.8% of these
same applications. Id.
84. Austin, supra note 11, at 297. Congress included such guidelines in BMA-60
and BMA-66. See United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 364 (1967)
(BMA-66); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665, 679-80
(1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (BMA-60). "Ever since the days of the first and second
Banks of the United States and McCulloch v. Maryland (4 Wheat. 316, 1819) [sic], it
has been generally accepted that banking is a field subject to special regulation by
virtue of its effect upon and relation to the fiscal and monetary policies of the Federal
Government under article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States." S.
REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1959).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (OCC's
decision to approve a proposed merger between two banks in Washington affirmed
because the Justice Department failed to prove that the merger would violate the
Clayton Act); Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
376 U.S. 665 (1964); Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
86. 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
87. Id. at 876-77.
88. Id. In MHT, the participants had already consummated their merger prior to
the suit brought by the Justice Department. Thus, after the district court held in
favor of the Justice Department, the divestiture of the merger was very difficult due
to the nature of the assets of commercial banks. Fortunately, since the merger was
consummated prior to the PNB decision, the grandfather provisions of BMA-66
effectively nullified the district court's decision and divestiture was not required. See
note 47 supra.
89. 240 F. Supp. at 956.
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C. Justice Department Predominance
At present, the Justice Department is free to bring suit whenever it
disagrees with a banking agency's approval of a proposed merger. 90
To many of the smaller banks, the mere filing of a suit by the Justice
Department is akin to a denial. 9' The Justice Department's ability to
intimidate commercial banks into abandoning a proposed merger is
well established. 92 Between 1961 and 1970, of the thirty-seven suits
filed by the Government, sixteen were won by the Justice Department
when the parties abandoned the proposed merger before trial.9 3 Be-
cause smaller banks have limited time and resources, they would
rather drop the proposed merger than risk the chance of losing to the
Department of Justice after lengthy litigation.14 For these banks, the
most significant consideration is that the Justice Department has never
lost an actual competition case which reached final adjudication.9 5
Since 1970, banks have either abandoned the proposed merger,
accepted a consent decree or lost to the Justice Department when the
merger involved actual competition.9 6 In addition, the amendments to
the Expediting Act of 197497 forced civil antitrust litigation through
90. BMA-66 provides that the responsible agency must notify the Attorney Gen-
eral of any approved merger and that, unless an emergency exists, such as the
probable failure of one of the merging banks, the transaction be stayed for thirty days
to give the Justice Department an opportunity to enjoin it. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(6)
(1976); note 47 supra and accompanying text.
91. See Austin, supra note 11, at 326-27. Justice Harlan, dissenting in United
States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970), noted that the
legality of every merger between two directly competing banks, no matter how
small, has been placed in doubt. Id. at 374 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Phillipsburg Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. involved the merger of two banks in a town with a population of
28,500. Combined, the two banks had only $38.4 million in deposits. Id. at 354-55.
Comparatively speaking, the merging banks ranked among the smaller banks of this
country. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645, 647
(D.N.J. 1969), rev'd, 399 U.S. 350 (1970). Prior to Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., the Department of Justice attacked mergers of large banks and left open the
issue of whether mergers of small banks in small towns were also subject to the
antitrust laws. Austin, supra note 11, at 326-27.
92. Austin, supra note 11, at 366.
93. Id. at 321-26.
94. Id. at 326.
95. Id. at 363.
96. Id. at 368. All this occurs in light of the fact that the courts have not yet
specified any numbers to determine anticompetitive concentration levels. On the
other hand, industrial cases, unlike bank merger cases, "reveal a complete analysis of
the trend as well as the resultant concentration levels exhibited from the merger." Id.
97. Act of Dec. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 5, 88 Stat. 1706, 1709 (presently
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 29(a) (1976)) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970)).
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the circuit courts before Supreme Court review. This revision
stretched the litigation period by approximately two years, thereby
increasing the costs of litigation"8 and further discouraging challenges
to the Justice Department's analysis.
In essence, the Justice Department can shape the general guidelines
for commercial bank antitrust law by the mere filing of a suit. In light
of the extensive time and effort expended in the analysis and evalua-
tion of proposed mergers, the FRB, FDIC and OCC are justifiably
dismayed when member banks decide to abandon agency-approved
mergers because of the Department of Justice's opposition.', This kind
of duplicative effort is unjustifiable, especially during a period of
financial austerity.
IV. The Expanding Line of Commerce
A. Judicial Recognition of Banking Changes
At present, the banking agencies generally apply a broad standard
when defining the relevant line of commerce. 100 The Supreme Court's
definition of the line of commerce, though arguably apropos when
first announced in PNB, has become anachronistic due to changes in
the financial marketplace. 01 During the late 1960's and the early
1970's, district courts often expressed a belief that the line of com-
98. Austin, supra note 11, at 365.
99. Id. at 326.
100. See notes 64-75 supra and accompanying text.
101. For a discussion of current changes in the market, see notes 117-89 infra and
accompanying text.
An outdated regulatory structure, unstable economy, and dramatic changes in the
financial marketplace have contributed to the need for revisions of bank merger law.
Less regulated institutions are providing new services, "often in direct competition
with traditional depository institutions." LaFalce, Banking in the Eighties, 37 Bus.
LAW. 839 (1982). See also Ferrara & Roiter, Legislative and Market Forces Reshape
Financial Services Industry, Bus. L. MEMO, Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 3 (discussion of the
fading distinctions between financial institutions). If all other financial institutions
are included in the relevant line of commerce, the percentage participation of
commercial banks before and after a merger might become a less substantial statistic.
See United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 310 F. Supp. 157, 168 (D. Md. 1970) (merger of
two banks held not to violate the antitrust laws but in fact tended to satisfy the
convenience and needs of the community). However, unlike some lower courts, see
notes 103-09 infra and accompanying text, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that commercial banking constitutes a separate line of commerce "distinguished by a
unique clustering of products and services not available at any other type of financial
institution" and thus has never upheld a case in which thrift institutions were
included in the relevant product market with commercial banks. Bleier & Eisenbeis,
supra note 14, at 376.
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merce was broader than the Supreme Court held it to be, 102 despite
contrary contentions by the Department of Justice. In United States v.
Crocker-Anglo National Bank 0 3 and United States v. Provident Na-
tional Bank, 04 the courts accepted an expanded definition of the line
of commerce and based their decision, in part, on the fact that the
phrase "line of commerce" was omitted from BMA-66."15 District
courts in Idaho, 10 6 Maryland, 10 7 New Jersey, 10 8 and Mississippil09 ex-
panded the line of commerce due to competition from other institu-
tions providing financial products and services similar to those offered
by commercial banks. Thus, while the district courts have often in-
cluded financial institutions other than banks in the line of commerce,
the Supreme Court has consistently limited the relevant market to
commercial banks only."10
In 1974, the Supreme Court finally recognized the changing nature
of the banking industry. In United States v. Connecticut National
Bank"' (CNB), the Justice Department sought to enjoin a merger
between two national banks, the Connecticut National Bank and the
First New Haven National Bank, the fourth and eighth largest com-
mercial banks in Connecticut." l2 The district court upheld the OCC's
decision to approve the merger and concluded that the appropriate
line of commerce included both commercial banks and savings
102. In United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970),
Justice Harlan noted in his dissent that the influence nonbank financial institutions,
like thrifts, have on the product market could be used to rebut the presumption of
illegality raised by the percentage-of-concentration figures. He reasoned that since
these other financial institutions offer close substitutes for the products and services of
commercial banks, they should be included in the line of commerce. Id. at 377-82
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
103. 277 F. Supp. 133, 154-57 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
104. 280 F. Supp. 1, 7-8 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
105. Shay & Yingling, New Approaches to Banks' Product Market Weighed, Legal
Times of Wash., June 22, 1981, at 20, col. 4.
106. United States v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 315 F. Supp. 261, 267 (D. Idaho
1970) (OCC's decision to approve a proposed merger between two banks in Idaho
affirmed because the evidence established that the merger would not substantially
lessen competition).
107. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 310 F. Supp. 157, 168 (D. Md. 1970).
108. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645, 647
(D.N.J. 1969), rev'd, 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
109. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 301 F. Supp. 1161, 1180-81 (S.D. Miss.
1969) (OCC's decision to approve a proposed merger between two banks affirmed
because it would not have any adverse or anticompetitive effects).
110. Shay & Yingling, supra note 105, at 21, col. 4.
111. 362 F. Supp. 240 (D. Conn. 1973). vacated, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
112. Id. at 241. Combined, the two banks would have held 10.3% of the deposits
in commercial banks in Connecticut. 418 U.S. at 658.
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banks.11 3 The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision,
choosing to adhere to the old definition of the line of commerce.11 4
The Court nevertheless indicated a willingness to expand the old line
of commerce definition in an appropriate case. 1 5
B. The Assimilation of Commercial Bank and Thrift Institution
Services
In PNB, the Court recognized that a significant distinction between
commercial banks and thrifts was that commercial banks, unlike
other financial institutions, could alone accept demand deposit
(checking) accounts.116 Before the CNB decision was handed down in
1974, thrift institutions in many of the New England states had al-
ready been granted the power to maintain checking or NOW11 7 ac-
113. 362 F. Supp. at 281. The district court found that meaningful competition
existed between commercial and savings banks for personal checking accounts, real
estate mortgages, personal loans, and commercial loans. Id. at 280.
114. 418 U.S. at 660-66.
115. The Court stated:
We do not say, and Phillipsburg National Bank . . . and Philadelphia.
National Bank . . . do not say, that in a case involving a merger of
commercial banks a court may never consider savings banks and commer-
cial banks as operating in the same line of commerce, no matter how
similar their services and economic behavior. At some stage in the develop-
ment of savings banks it will be unrealistic to distinguish them from
commercial banks for purposes of the Clayton Act. In Connecticut, that
point may well be reached when and if savings banks become significant
participants in the marketing of bank services to commercial enterprises.
Id. at 666. Thus, the Court's dicta in CNB laid the groundwork for a new perspective
toward bank mergers, hastened by the expansion of financial services offered by
thrifts and other financial institutions.
116. 374 U.S. at 326. "Some commercial banking products or services are so
distinctive that they are entirely free of effective competition from products or
services or other financial institutions; the checking account is in this category." Id.
at 356. Among the other important functions of commercial banks are the creation of
additional money and credit, management of the checking account system, and
furnishing of short-term business loans. Id. at 326-27. For a list of banking products,
see id. at 326 n.5. For a discussion of what distinguishes a commercial bank from a
savings and loan association, see Alcorn, Phillipsburg and Beyond-Developing
Trends in Substantive Standards for Bank Mergers, 9 Hous. L. REV. 417, 418 (1972).
117. "NOW" is an acronym for "negotiable order of withdrawal." Pfeiler, Nation-
wide NOW Accounts: Current Legal Issues, Supervisory Update, 14 AKRON L. REV.
397, 397 (1980-81). NOW accounts allow depositors to draw negotiable drafts,
payable to a third party, against deposits they have made into interest-bearing
accounts. D. CRANE & M. RILEY, NOW ACCOUNTS 1 (1978). NOW accounts are
intended to be the savings bank's equivalent of a commercial bank's checking ac-
counts. Thus, no passbook is issued to the depositor. See New York State Bankers
Ass'n v. Albright, 38 N.Y.2d 430, 434-35, 343 N.E.2d 735, 737, 381 N.Y.S.2d 17, 19
1982]
326 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
counts. Initially, the right to provide these services was granted only
to state-chartered depository institutions in Massachusetts"l 8 and New
Hampshire" 9 in 1972.120 In 1973, Congress authorized all federally-
chartered institutions, with the exception of credit unions, in these
two states to offer NOW accounts. 12 1 The popularity of this innova-
tion prompted other New England states to authorize their state-
chartered financial institutions to offer checking accounts.122 In 1976,
Congress authorized the federally-chartered financial institutions in
the remaining New England states to maintain NOW accounts 12 3 in
order to insure competitive equality.12 4
By statutory amendment, thrifts in New York acquired the power
to hold NOW accounts in 1976. In 1974, the New York Superintend-
ent of Banks, pursuant to section 238(6) of the Banking Law, 125 issued
Regulation 301.1126 which permitted savings banks and savings and
(1975) (discussed at notes 125-27 infra and accompanying text), modified, 38 N.Y.2d
953, 347 N.E.2d 923, 383 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1976).
NOWs are generally deposited for collection by the payee or transferee in his own
bank and are presented, via a commercial bank by arrangement with the drawee
savings bank, to the drawee savings bank for payment. The depositor's NOW ac-
count is then charged to pay the order. As with a commercial bank, a monthly
statement is furnished to the depositor by the savings bank. Id. at 435, 343 N.E.2d at
737, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
118. See Consumer Sav. Bank v. Commissioner of Banks, 361 Mass. 717, 718, 282
N.E.2d 416, 417 (1972) (holding that savings banks in Massachusetts could offer
NOW accounts).
119. See New Hampshire Bankers Ass'n v. Nelson, 113 N.H. 127, 128, 302 A.2d
810, 811 (1973) (letter by State Banking Commissioner on Oct. 26, 1972, stating that
a savings bank may offer NOW accounts).
120. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTIONS DEREGULATION AND MONETARY CONTROL ACT OF 1980, S. REP. No. 368,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 236, 243
(Senate Report accompanying the Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980, discussed at notes 133-37 infra and accompanying text).
121. Act of Aug. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-100, §§ 2(a)-2(b), 87 Stat. 342.
122. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-104b to 36-104d, 36-104f to 36-104m, 36-
182a (1981) (authorization of NOW accounts); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, §§ 423,
521, 721 (1980) (authorization of demand deposit accounts). See SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS DEREGULATION
AND MONETARY CONTROL ACT OF 1980, S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 236, 243.
123. Act of Feb. 27, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 2, 90 Stat. 197; SENATE COMM.
ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS DEREGULATION
AND MONETARY CONTROL ACT OF 1980, S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 236, 243.
124. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTIONS DEREGULATION AND MONETARY CONTROL ACT OF 1980, S. REP. No. 368,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 236, 243.
125. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 238(6) (McKinney 1971).
126. [1974] 3 N.Y.C.R.R. pt. 301.
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loan associations to offer checking accounts to their customers. The
New York State Bankers Association (NYSBA), representing most of
the commercial banks in New York, opposed the Superintendent's
action and filed suit. 12 7 Although the NYSBA was victorious, its suc-
cess was short-lived. In 1976, the New York State Legislature
amended section 238(6) to allow savings banks to Offer NOW ac-
counts.128 In 1978, federally-chartered depository institutions in New
York were authorized by Congress to offer NOW accounts.
129
Until 1980, thrifts could not accept NOW accounts unless they were
situated in either New England,1 30 New York' 3I or New Jersey. I 32 This
was changed with the enactment of the Depository Institutions Dereg-
ulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980133 (1980 Act). Under title
three 134 of the 1980 Act, the Consumer Checking Equity Act of 1980,
the power to accept NOW accounts was extended to all federally-
chartered thrifts. 135 Credit unions were also granted the power to hold
quasi-checking accounts. These accounts are referred to as share draft
accounts and function in the same manner as NOW accounts.136
127. In New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 38 N.Y.2d 430, 343 N.E.2d
735, 381 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1975), modified, 38 N.Y.2d 953, 347 N.E.2d 923, 383
N.Y.S.2d 597 (1976), the New York Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the NYSBA.
The court held that the Superintendent was not empowered under § 238(6) to issue
regulations allowing savings banks to offer checking accounts. However, because
these checking accounts had been offered since 1974 and were in wide use, the court
refused to terminate them until March, 1976, so that additional legislation could be
enacted to remedy the situation. Id. at 441, 343 N.E.2d at 741, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
128. See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 238(6) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
129. See Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1301, 92 Stat. 3641, 3712; SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS DEREGULATION AND MONE-
TARY CONTROL ACT OF 1980, S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 236, 243.
130. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTIONS DEREGULATION AND MONETARY CONTROL ACT OF 1980, S. REP. No. 368,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 236, 240.
131. Id.
132. In 1979, state-chartered savings and loan associations in New Jersey acquired
the power to offer checking accounts via statutory amendment. See 1979 N.J. Sess.
Law Serv. ch. 258, § 1(17) (West) (presently codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:12B-
48(17) (West Supp. 1982-1983)).
133. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
134. Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 301-313, 94 Stat. 145-51 (1980).
135. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTIONS DEREGULATION AND MONETARY CONTROL ACT OF 1980, S. REP. No. 368,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 236, 242.
136. Id. at 8-9, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 244.
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The 1980 Act broadens the asset and liability powers of thrifts. 3 7
Hence, it significantly narrows the distinctions among the powers and
services of thrifts and commercial banks, and expands the relevant
line of commerce. The 1980 Act negates one of the fundamental
premises for maintaining a narrower definition of the line of com-
merce-the commercial bank monopoly on checking accounts. 38 This
represents another step towards the continuing erosion of distinctions
between banks and other financial institutions. 139 For the present, the
1980 Act's symbolic effects may outweigh its quantitative impact,140
but it should force the courts and the Department of Justice to take a
fresh look at the line of commerce issue.' 4'
Other factors in the market are eroding the basis upon which the
old line of commerce definition was predicated as well. For example,
in response to the recent series of savings bank failures, 42 statutes that
137. Some of the powers granted to thrifts under the 1980 Act are: (1) the estab-
lishment of nationwide NOW accounts at federally insured depository institutions
(§ 303); (2) the establishment of remote service units at all federally insured savings
and loan associations (S & Ls) (§ 304); (3) the granting of commercial, real estate
and consumer loans by federal S & Ls up to 20% of their assets (§ 401); (4) the
investment in commercial paper by federal S & Ls up to 20% of their assets (§ 401);
(5) the issuance of credit cards by federal S & Ls (§ 402); (6) the granting of trust
powers to federal S & Ls (§ 403); (7) the granting of commercial, corporate, and
business loans by federal mutual savings banks up to 5% of their assets (§ 408(a));
and (8) the acceptance by federal mutual savings banks of demand deposits in
connection with a commercial, corporate, or business loan relationship (§ 408(b)).
Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 303-304, 401-403, 408, 94 Stat. 146, 151-57, 160 (1980).
138. In 1974, the Supreme Court noted that a savings bank's ability to offer
checking accounts would increase the degree of competition between savings and
commercial banks because "demand deposits have traditionally been a unique attrib-
ute of the latter institutions." Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. at 665.
139. In United States v. First Nat'l State Bancorp., 499 F. Supp. 793 (D.N.J.
1980), the court remarked:
Commercial banks face competition with respect to most of the financial
services they offer . . . . In . . . New Jersey, mutual savings banks and
savings and loan associations ("thrifts") offer essentially the same services
to the locally-limited retail customers as do commercial banks . . . . More-
over, the recently enacted Depository Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980 . . . insures the elimination of any remaining
distinctions between thrifts and commercial banks with respect to retail
financial services provided to the locally-limited customer.
Id. at 800 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
140. Bleier & Eisenbeis, supra note 14, at 383.
141. The expansion of the definition of the line of commerce can alter the evalua-
tion of the competitive effects of a proposed merger under the antitrust laws. It can,
for example, extend the range of permissible acquisitions that would otherwise have
been prohibited under the present line of commerce definition. Id. at 375.
142. For the first eight months of 1981, S & Ls had a net cash outflow of $20
billion, as compared to a net cash inflow of $5 billion in 1980. During this same
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will ease merger and branching restrictions for these institutions have
been proposed.1 43 One of these proposals, the Garn-St. Germain De-
pository Institutions Act of 1982,144 was recently passed by Congress 145
and signed into law by President Reagan. 14 The key provisions of this
legislation include giving regulators the power to approve mergers of
ailing institutions across state lines 147 and expanding thrift asset
powers by permitting them to make commercial and other non-mort-
gage loans 14 using up to ten percent of their total assets.149
period, 80% of this Nation's S & Ls operated at a loss. In 1981, Congress recognized
that at least 300 out of the 3840 S & Ls were in serious financial trouble. For the
period ending on October 1, 1981, mutual savings banks suffered losses in 27 out of
30 months. 127 CONG. REC. H7801 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1981) (statement of Rep.
Moffet). For the last half of 1981, losses at the Nation's 3217 federally insured S & Ls
reached a record $3.1 billion. N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1982, at D1, col. 1. The 34 savings
banks in New York City alone lost $337 million during the fourth quarter of 1981. Id.
Mar. 1, 1982, at D1, col. 3.
Throughout 1981 and 1982, newspapers reported that thrifts were failing and in
need of either new sources of capital or merger partners. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Oct.
29, 1981, at 2, col. 3 (Greenwich Savings Bank); N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1982, at D1,
col. 1 (Fidelity Savings and Loan Ass'n). These losses are attributable to high interest
rates. While other financial intermediaries, like mutual funds, were offering invest-
ments at current market rates, savings banks were paying a mere 51/2 % on time
deposits. This caused an exodus from the thrifts to the higher yield money market
instruments. Thrifts cannot match these rates due to the low rates they earn on
outstanding mortgages. Id., Nov. 3, 1981, at D2, col. 1. Hence, these thrifts no
longer have a cash base from which to make new loans at current interest rates and
are left with mortgages dating back to the 1960's, when interest rates were lower. See
id., Jan. 4, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
143. See, e.g., S. 2531 and S. 2532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S5308-
18 (daily ed. May 13, 1982); H.R. 4603, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC.
H7801-02 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1981), 127 CONG. REC. H7838-42 (daily ed. Oct. 28,
1981); S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. SlI, 254-76 (daily ed. Oct. 7,
1981).
144. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982).
145. See 128 CONG. REc. S12,709-11 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (Senate); 128
CONG. REC. H8431-39 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (House); Congress Passes Depository
Institutions Amendments Bill, FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) No. 940, at 1 (Oct. 8,
1982).
146. 18 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1319-20 (Oct. 18, 1982); N.Y. Times, Oct. 18,
1982, at D1, col. 3.
147. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 116, 96 Stat. 1469, 1476-79 (1982); S. REP. No. 641,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-12 (1982) (Senate Conference Report on the Garn-St. Ger-
main Depository Institutions Act of 1982).
148. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 325, 96 Stat. 1500 (1982); S. REP. No. 641, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1982); Congress Clears Way for Passage of Financial Reform
Legislation, 39 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 600, 601 (Oct. 4, 1982).
149. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 325, 96 Stat. 1500 (1982); S. REP. No. 641, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1982); N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1982, at D1, col. 3.
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The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) has proposed
broader powers for federally-chartered savings and loan associations
(S & Ls) which would allow these thrifts to become more competitive
with commercial banks and other financial institutions.1 50 In addi-
tion, the FHLBB, with the support of the Justice Department, has
proposed a rule easing the restrictions on supervised interstate acquisi-
tions of failing S & Ls.'5 1
These grants of new powers, some of which were traditionally
granted to commercial banks alone, will increase markedly the com-
petition between thrifts and commercial banks. The more aggressive
and stronger thrifts are taking advantage of these laws to further
strengthen their position in the marketplace and to increase their
market shares.15 2 Aggressive thrifts may account for the fact that
commercial banks in New Jersey held only 51.8 % of the total deposits
in that state's depository institutions in 1980. 1,3
A direct result of more liberal merger and branching restrictions on
thrifts is the emergence of the First Interstate Banking Corporation, a
tri-state savings institution doing business in California, New York
and Florida.' 54 This combination,' 55 the first federally supervised in-
terstate merger, was consummated on September 4, 1981.15 In a
similar transaction, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion (FSLIC) gave the California Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion of Los Angeles permission to cross state lines and acquire four
institutions in Florida and Georgia.157
150. See 47 Fed. Reg. 8204 (1982); N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1982, at D3, col. 1.
151. See 47 Fed. Reg. 17,999 (1982); Justice Urges FHLBB to Drop Restrictions on
Interstate Branching in Supervisory Mergers, [Jan.-June] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA)
No. 24, at A-18 (June 14, 1982); NSLL Applauds FHLBB Proposed Rule on Interstate
Branching, 39 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 5 (July 5, 1982).
152. One aggressive thrift, the Buffalo Savings Bank, under the direction of its
president, Ross B. Kenzie, has been actively seeking to acquire troubled thrift institu-
tions. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1982, at Dl, col. 3. Thus far, Buffalo Savings has
purchased the Union Dime Savings Bank, the New York Bank for Savings, and the
Western New York Savings Bank. See id., Apr. 4, 1982, § 3, at 1, col. 2; id., Mar. 24,
1982, at Al, col. 6; id., Jan. 16, 1982, at 41, col. 5.
153. See First Nat'l State Bancorp., 499 F. Supp. at 800.
154. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1982, at D1, col. 3.
155. The merger involved the Washington Savings and Loan Association of Flor-
ida, the West Side Federal Savings and Loan Association of New York, and the
Citizens Savings and Loan Association of San Francisco. Id.
156. FHLBB Res. Nos. 81-523, 81-526 & 81-497, noted in Leibold, Mergers of
FSLIC Insured Savings and Loan Associations, 37 Bus. LAW. 868, 872 n.21 (1982).
157. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1982, at 39, col. 5.
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C. Increasing Competition from Other Financial Intermediaries
1. Money Market Funds
If the proposed deregulation of the financial services industry be-
comes a reality,15 8 commercial banks can expect fierce competition for
deposits from investment banks. 59 Many investment companies are
already sponsoring money market funds with check writing privi-
leges. 16 0 A money market fund'' allows investors to trade through a
158. See notes 182-85 infra and accompanying text.
159. The separation of banking from the securities business has been a fundamen-
tal tenet underlying the banking system ever since the passage of §§ 5(c), 16, 20 & 21
of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24,335, 337 & 378(a) (1976) (the Act). The
purpose of the Act was to prohibit commercial banks from going into the investment
banking business. 77 CONG. REC. 3725, 3730 (1933) (statement by Senator Glass
during debate on Senate version of what later became the Glass-Steagall Act). See
also id. at 3835 (debate in the House of Representatives). Although many believed
that it was improper to engage in commercial and investment banking simultane-
ously, banks began establishing securities affiliates in 1908. A Resolution to Make a
Complete Survey of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems, 1931: Hear-
ings on S. Res. 71 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 1052 (1931) [hereinafter cited as 1931 Hearings];
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971). These affiliates were still in
existence at the time of the passage of the Act. Congress endeavored to abolish these
affiliates because the failure of the Bank of the United States in 1930 was widely
attributed to that bank's transactions with its many securities affiliates. See 1931
Hearings, supra, at 116-17, 1017 & 1068. Congress believed that commercial banks
opened themselves up to financial dangers and risks when they participated in the
trading and ownership of speculative securities. C. GLASS, OPERATION OF THE NA-
TIONAL AND FEDERAL REsERVE BANKING SYSTEMS, S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
6, 8, 10 (1933).
160. Edwards, Banks and Securities Activities: Legal and Economic Perspectives
on the Glass-Steagall Act, in THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND SECURITIES
INDUSTRIES 273, 274 (L. Goldberg & L. White eds. 1979). Money market funds are
managed and sponsored by a separate company that acts as the fund's advisor. See R.
EDMISTER, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MARKETS AND MANAGEMENT 212-13 (1980). See
also Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 943 (1978) (mutual fund investment advisor liable for breach of fiduciary duty
because it acquired from the mutual fund a patently one-sided revision of advisory
contract increasing the expense ratio limitation); Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D.
542, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (shareholder derivative suit against a mutual fund, its
directors, investment advisors, and principal underwriter, alleging a breach of fidu-
ciary duty due to excessive advisory fees dismissed as plaintiffs failed to meet criteria
for bringing derivative suits under the Investment Company Act); Note, Termination
of Section 36(b) Actions by Mutual Fund Directors: Are the Watchdogs Still the
Shareholders' Best Friends?, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 720, 720-21 (1982).
161. A money market fund is a species of a mutual fund. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,
1980, at D13, col. 4. See R. EDMISTER, supra note 160, at 211. A money market fund
is a portfolio of short-term, prime-grade securities, such as certificates of deposit,
Treasury bills, and commercial paper. Id.
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mutual fund. 16 2 The capital in the money market fund is invested in
short-term debt securities. 6 3 As a result, these investment companies
give the small saver an opportunity to invest indirectly in a diversified
portfolio of short-term, large denomination money market instru-
ments1 4 which often have a much higher return than banks can offer
on deposits .16 5
These money market funds have been successful in diverting a large
amount of money from the traditional depository institutions.' Since
their inception in the early 1970's,67 the money market funds have
grown rapidly. As of December 19, 1979, there were forty-two money
market funds 6 8 with assets of $100 million or more that were avail-
able to individual investors. As of October 6, 1982, there were over
100 such money market funds. 6 9 The funds had total assets of about
$180 billion at the end of 1981.170
162. A mutual fund is an open-end investment company. SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY
GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1966). An open-end invest-
rnent company can offer for sale any redeemable security that it issues. "Redeem-
able" means that the issuer is legally obligated to repurchase the security for the value
of the issuer's net assets that the security represents. Note, The Mutual Fund Indus-
try: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 732, 742-43 (1969). The goal of a mutual
fund is to achieve investment efficiency by pooling the resources of its shareholders.
See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934
(1977); Note, supra note 160, at 720 n.7.
163. R. EDMISTER, supra note 160, at 211; N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1980, at D13, col.
4. See also First Multifund for Daily Income v. United States, 602 F.2d 332, 334 (Ct.
Cl. 1979) (open-end registered investment company which resells redeemed shares of
its stock that had been sold under a previous registration statement filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission is required to file a new registration statement
covering such shares), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980). Typical investments include
short-term United States government securities, government agency securities, bank
certificates and bankers acceptances. See Note, supra note 160, at 720 n.2.
164. 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 174, 175 (Mar. 1982) (statement by Lyle E. Gramley,
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the Subcommit-
tee on Domestic Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, March 3, 1982).
165. The major reason for their popularity is that money market funds, unlike
bank deposits, do not have a ceiling as to the rate of interest investors can earn. See
Axilrod, Monetary Policy, Money Supply, and the Federal Reserve's Operating Pro-
cedures, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 13, 17 (Jan. 1982).
166. For example, while sources of funds to credit markets from check deposits
exhibited an unstable trend between 1976 and 1981, contributions from money
market fund shares rose from an insignificant amount to $107.5 billion. 68 Fed. Res.
Bull. A45 (Aug. 1982).
167. D. DARST, HANDBOOK OF THE BOND AND MONEY MARKETS 298 (1981).
168. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1979, at D6, col. 6.
169. Id., Oct. 8, 1982, at D10, col. 5.
170. Axilrod, supra note 165, at 17 n.10.
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The two largest money market funds are managed by Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 171 One of these funds is the Cash
Management Account 72 (CMA). An attractive feature of this pro-
gram is that the investor receives a checking account with Bank One
of Columbus, Ohio.173 Thus, the CMA has the advantage of offering
high returns on money market funds while allowing the investor to
have immediate access to his funds by drawing on the CMA as if it
were a checking account. CMA customers receive a monthly state-
ment, similar to a regular checking account statement, detailing all
CMA transactions. 74
Merrill Lynch's CMA program, especially its checking account fea-
ture, has elicited vigorous objections from the commercial banking
industry. 75 For example, bankers in Utah lobbied for legislation to
place Merrill Lynch and other firms like it under the control of that
state's banking department. 76 However, Merrill Lynch and its allies
in the securities industry succeeded in thwarting the proposal.1 77 In
Tennessee, an issue arose over whether the CMA program violated
that state's banking laws. The Attorney General of Tennessee deter-
mined that Merrill Lynch's CMA program did not constitute unlawful
banking in violation of that state's statutes.7 8 Although Merrill
171. As of October 6, 1982, the Merrill Lynch Cash Management Account (CMA)
Money Fund had over $15.5 billion in assets and ranked second only to the Merrill
Lynch Ready Assets account (over $22.5 billion) in size. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1982, at
D10, col. 5. Ironically, the idea for Merrill Lynch's CMA program originated in 1975
and is traced to Donald Regan, then Chairman of the Board at Merrill Lynch, who
later outlined the Reagan Administration's proposal to deregulate the financial serv-
ices industry. See Finfgeld v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 78
Civ. 5987, slip op. at 6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1981) (plaintiff's claim that defendant
misappropriated his business idea for the CMA program dismissed and defendant's
motion for summary judgment granted); notes 182-85 infra and accompanying text.
172. The CMA is a three component financial program. It consists of a Merrill
Lynch securities margin account, a no-load money market mutual fund, and a Visa
credit card account maintained by a bank in Ohio. MERRILL LYNCH CASH MANAGE-
MENT ACCOUNT PROGRAM, PROSPECTUS i (July 29, 1982); Finfgeld, slip op. at 5.
173. When a CMA check is drawn, it is paid and cleared by Bank One, which
notifies Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch then pays the amount of the check out of any
cash in the investor's CMA which has not yet been invested in money market fund
shares. If there is insufficient cash available, Merrill Lynch then sells an appropriate
number of shares of the investor's CMA holdings to cover the balance. PROSPECTUS,
supra note 172, at iii-iv.
174. Id. at iv.
175. Cole, The National Bank of Merrill Lynch, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1982, § 3, at
1, col. 2.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Money Market Fund Account, 10A Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. 538, 540 (1981). In
Oregon, the Justice Department found that the CMA program did not constitute
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Lynch's CMA program has not yet been held to fall within any state's
definition of banking, it does directly compete with commercial
banks.
2. Deregulation
Recently, commercial banks have been trying to enter the securities
industry. 17 The deregulation of the banking industry'"0 may hasten
rather than delay a reevaluation of the line of commerce issue by the
Justice Department if small commercial banks find it impossible to
compete with the increasing array of services offered by larger com-
mercial banks and other financial institutions. On January 7, 1983,
Bankamerica Corporation, the holding company for the Bank of
America, the largest commercial bank in the United States, received
approval from the FRB to acquire Charles Schwab Corporation, a
discount securities firm.' 8' On February 4, 1982, Treasury Secretary
Donald Regan outlined the Reagan Administration's proposal for de-
regulating financial services institutions. 8 2 The proposal would allow
bank holding companies to engage in various underwriting activities
by acquiring a securities affiliate. 83 In addition, the deregulation
banking under that state's statutes. Op. U.S. Att'y Gen. No. 8100 (Feb. 11, 1982). In
addition, pursuant to an agreement between the Colorado State Banking Commis-
sioner and Merrill Lynch, customers in Colorado who subscribe to the CMA program
can draw checks only in amounts of $200 or more. PROSPECTUS, supra note 172, at v.
179. One commentator in support of these efforts states that "[i]f nondepository
institutions are to be allowed to compete with banks in functions long associated with
depository institutions, then ... certain depository institutions should be permitted
to compete in areas long associated with the securities industry." LaFalce, supra note
101, at 846.
180. See Bus. WK., May 31, 1982, at 68; id., Apr. 5, 1982, at 30; Wall St. J., Mar.
9, 1982, at 30, col. 1; id., Feb. 12, 1982, at 28, col. 1; Barrons, Dec. 14, 1981, at 30,
col. 1; Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1981, at 2, col. 2.
181. FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) No. 954, at 1 (Jan. 14, 1983); Wall St. J., Jan.
10, 1983, at 4, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1983, at 1, col. 4. The Justice Department
raised no objections to the proposed takeover. Bankamerica Takeover of Charles
Schwab Securities Firm No Problem for Justice, [Jan.-June] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA)
No. 23, at B-i (June 7, 1982). The Justice Department's acquiescence may have been
in deference to the Reagan Administration's desire to deregulate the financial services
industry. See notes 182-85 infra and accompanying text.
182. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1982, at D10, col. 6. On June 24, 1982, Representative
Stanton introduced the Bank Holding Company Deregulation Act of 1982, H.R.
6720, in the House of Representatives on behalf of the Reagan Administration. See
H.R. 6720, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H3969 (daily ed. June 24, 1982). As
a result, securities firms are considering entry into the banking industry, since they
view banking as potential earnings havens. Edwards, supra note 160, at 274.
183. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1982, at D1O, col. 6.
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would broaden the ability of bank holding companies to enter new
lines of commerce, such as real estate development and insurance.1
84
The proposal, if adopted, may gradually reduce the distinction be-
tween the banking and securities industries. 85 On November 15,
1982, all commercial banks and thrift institutions were authorized to
offer money market funds.186 The increasing interaction between the
securities and the banking industries will continue to erode the tradi-
tional definition of the line of commerce with respect to bank mergers.
3. Non-Traditional Competitors
Other industries are encroaching into services traditionally supplied
by commercial banks as well. Sears Roebuck and Company, J.C.
Penney Company, Inc. and Montgomery Ward and Company are
offering consumer loans, once the private preserve of commercial
banks, 87 to their retail customers.1 8 8 In addition, American Express
Company and The Prudential Insurance Company of America are
offering limited banking services.1 89 Unlike commercial banks, these
other industries are not subject to myriad banking laws and regula-
tions. The McFadden Act, 90 for example, restricts the interstate
branching activities of commercial banks,' 9' but no such interstate
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 47 Fed. Reg. 53,710, 53,716 (1982). The regulation authorizing these ac-
counts became effective on December 14, 1982. Id. at 53,711.
187. Lowy, A Tale of Two Antitrust Rulings: Defining Thrift Institutions, Nat'l
L.J., May 17, 1982, at 16, col. 1, 3. In addition, Sears Roebuck has acquired Dean
Witter Reynolds, an investment bank, which offers money market funds. See Cole,
supra note 175, at 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1982, at D10, col. 4.
188. Lowy, supra note 187, at 16, col. 1, 3.
189. Cole, supra note 175, at 1, col. 4; Ferrara & Roiter, supra note 93, at 3.
American Express and Prudential Insurance have achieved this via cross-industry
acquisitions. See id. at 3. Prudential bought Bache, Halsey, Stuart and American
Express acquired Shearson, Loeb, Rhoades. Cole, supra note 175, at 1, col. 4. Both
Bache and Shearson offer money market funds. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1982, at D10,
col. 5.
This trend has been exhibited by companies completely outside the financial
services industry. For instance, McMahon Furniture Stores, a retail furniture chain
located in Carlsbad, California, has applied for a national bank charter in that state.
See [Jan.-June] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 25, at A-25 (June 21, 1982).
190. Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228-29 (initially amended
by Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 162, 189-90) (presently codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(c)-36(d) (1976)).
191. Section (c) of the McFadden Act specifically limits the branching activities of
national banks to the state in which that bank is situated. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)
(1976).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
restrictions are placed on other industries. Thus, it is conceivable that
corporate conglomerates like Sears Roebuck and Company may en-
gage in some form of interstate banking before commercial banks ever
acquire that power. This would afford these institutions a significant
competitive advantage over commercial banks.
Undoubtedly, other nonbanking institutions, both financial and
nonfinancial, are having a direct competitive impact on commercial
banks. The increasing encroachment on the commercial banking in-
dustry by thrifts and other corporations has served to eliminate the
notion that commercial banks provide a unique cluster of products
and services. As a result, the old definition of the line of commerce as
announced in PNB requires expansion. Although in the past the De-
partment of Justice did not recognize these changes in the product
market when applying the antitrust laws to bank mergers, it must do
so now in light of new merger guidelines. 9 2 These new guidelines
require a greater in-depth analysis of the relevant product market. In
addition, because bank regulatory agencies have had more experience
in identifying the recent permutations which have occurred in the
financial services industry, a greater interaction between the Depart-
ment of Justice and the regulators when reviewing proposed bank
mergers is imperative.
D. The 1982 Merger Guidelines
The 1982 merger guidelines 93 replace those issued in 1968.194 The
1968 merger guidelines were based on the "numbers game" methodol-
ogy. 19 5 Unlike the 1968 guidelines, the new guidelines draw heavily on
192. See notes 193-94 infra and accompanying text.
193. Dept. of Justice Press Release, New Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1982) (state-
ment of Attorney General William French Smith, at 1).
194. Id. New economic thinking and new judicial attitudes and decisions rendered
the 1968 guidelines obsolete. Id. at 2.
195. Baker, Justice Dept. Merger Guidelines Contribute a Dose of Rationality,
Nat'l L.J., June 28, 1982, at 16, col. 1. In considering whether a proposed merger
violated § 7 of the Clayton Act under the 1968 guidelines, the Supreme Court had to
determine: (1) what percent of the market the new bank would possess, and (2) the
overall concentration of the market. Comment, supra note 38, at 771. Justice Harlan
vehemently disagreed with this approach by the Supreme Court on at least three
occasions. See, e.g., United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S.
at 376-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. at 193
(Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. at
673 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court's use of such a test appears to go
against its prior decision in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962),
which stated "that a merger had to be functionally viewed, in the context of its
particular industry." Id. at 321-22 (footnote omitted).
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new economic thinking and contribute economic rationality to the
merger enforcement process. 1 6 Some commentators have suggested
that in PNB and Phillipsburg National Bank, the Supreme Court did
not consider economic reality when it made a judicial determination
of the concentration ratio. 9 7 These commentators have noted that the
Supreme Court avoids extensive economic analysis whenever a sim-
pler approach permits a more vigorous antitrust policy. 9 8
The old guidelines measured market shares using the four-firm
concentration ratio, which is the sum of the percentage market shares
of the top four firms in the market.z9 The new guidelines utilize the
Herfindahl index, which is the sum of the squares of the percentage
market share of each firm in the market. 200 The Department of Justice
then compares the Herfindahl index after the merger with the index
prior to the merger. 20 1
The 1982 guidelines also place a much greater emphasis on the
definition of the relevant product market.20 2 This may be the most
significant departure from the 1968 guidelines.2 0 3 Under the new
196. Baker, supra note 195, at col. 1. "The purpose of the new guidelines is to
reflect the current emphasis . . . on the need for economic evidence of harm or
potential harm to competition before a merger will be challenged." Dep't of Justice
Press Release, New Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1982) (Press Release at 4) (emlhasis
added).
197. See Whitesell & Kamens, supra note 24, at 754. Under the 1968 merger
guidelines, the concentration ratio was measured by the sum of the percentage shares
of the four largest firms in the market. Dep't of Justice Release, 1968 Merger
Guidelines, at 9 (May 30, 1968).
198. See M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 318 (1964);
Whitesell & Kamens, supra note 24, at 755 n.23.
199. Dep't of Justice Release, 1968 Merger Guidelines, at 9 (May 30, 1968); Dep't
of Justice Press Release, New Merger Guidelines (June 14. 1982 (Press Release at 5).
200. Dep't of Justice Press Release, New Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1982) (Press
Release at 5).
201. Id. at 6. When the Herfindahl index after the merger is below 1,000, the
market is deemed to be unconcentrated and a challenge by the Justice Department is
unlikely. If the index falls between 1,000 and 1,800, the market is moderately
concentrated and a challenge is still unlikely, provided the merger increases the index
by less than 100 points. If the change is greater than 100 points, a challenge by the
Justice Department is more likely. If the index is above 1,800, the market is consid-
ered highly concentrated. A challenge is unlikely if the merger produces an increase
in the index of less than 50 points. If the increase is between 50 and 100 points, a
challenge is more likely than not. If the increase is more than 100 points, then a
challenge is likely. Id. at 8-9. For example, the Herfindahl index in PNB would have
been 1,337 with an increase of 618 points. In Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, the Herfindahl
index would have been 2,677, with an increase of 269 points. Baker, supra note 195,
at col. 2.
202. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1982, at D1, col. 1.
203. Baker, supra note 195, col. 2. The 1968 Merger Guidelines did not provide
for an in-depth analysis of the line of commerce. For example, the old guidelines,
unlike those recently issued, did not provide for an analysis of the substitutability of
19821
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guidelines, the Justice Department will seek to identify all the firms
whose cooperation would be necessary to raise and maintain prices
above the competitive level. 20 4 For example, when considering
whether to include a particular product or firm in the market, it may
be helpful to hypothesize a small increase in price, and then consider
whether such action is likely to cause customers to shift to a different
supplier or a different product. If a sufficient number of customers do
shift to a substitute product or to an alternative supplier, such an
attempt to raise prices would not prove profitable and the market
would prove to have been too narrowly defined. 205 Thus, the Justice
Department will take the product of the merging firms to establish a
provisional market and include other products which the merging
firm's customers view as adequate substitutes at prevailing prices. 206
With the new emphasis on analyzing product substitutability, the
Justice Department will be required to weigh the following factors:
(1) Evidence of buyers' perceptions that the products are or are not
substitutes, particularly if those buyers have shifted purchases be-
tween the products in response to changes in relative price or other
competitive variables;
(2) Similarities or differences between the products in customary
usage, design, physical composition, and other technical character-
istics;
(3) Similarities or differences in the price movements of the prod-
ucts over a period of years; and
(4) Evidence of sellers' perceptions that the products are or are not
substitutes, particularly if business decisions have been based on
those perceptions .207
In identifying the firms that should be included in the relevant
product market, the new guidelines require that the Justice Depart-
ment look at alternative sources of supply in addition to considering
those firms currently producing and selling the relevant product.
First, the Department of Justice will look at the ability of a firm not
currently producing the relevant product to economically shift its
production facilities in response to an increase in the price of that
firms in determining market participants. Compare Dep't of Justice Release, 1968
Merger Guidelines, at 4-7 (May 30, 1968), with 1982 Merger Guidelines, discussed at
notes 208-10 infra and accompanying text.
204. Dep't of Justice Press Release, New Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1982) (Press
Release at 7).
205. Dep't of Justice Press Release, New Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1982) (Mer-
ger Guidelines at 5).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 7.
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product. If the firm can easily shift its existing productive and distrib-
utive facilities to sell and distribute the relevant product within six
months of a small but significant price increase, that firm will be
included in the market. 20 Second, the Justice Department will deter-
mine the durability of the products. If recycled or reconditioned
products represent viable substitutes for new products, then the De-
partment will include in the market those firms which recycle or
recondition the relevant product.20 9
Finally, the Department of Justice will consider the degree of inter-
nal consumption. Some firms which produce the relevant product
may either sell it or use it themselves. Should the firms decide to
consume the product internally, then they incur an opportunity cost.
If the price of the product increases, the opportunity cost will also
increase. Hence, the Justice Department will include in the market
firms which produce internally consumable products and which will
change their behavior should the market price increase.
210
The new merger guidelines are likely to force the Department of
Justice to radically redefine the relevant line of commerce in the
context of bank mergers. A current analysis of the availability of
substitute products and alternative sources of traditional commercial
banking services will show that commercial banks are facing dramati-
cally increasing competition from other financial institutions.
V. Conclusion
The revolution in the financial marketplace has caused great
changes in the banking industry. The governmental bodies most quali-
fied to monitor this rapidly changing field are the FRB, FDIC and
OCC. The agencies' expertise, as recognized by Congress, makes them
the ideal watchdog over bank merger activity. Moreover, commercial
banks no longer are characterized by a unique set of services which
they alone offer. As the trend towards homogeneity continues in the
financial services industry, the Justice Department should reevaluate
its use of commercial banking as the relevant line of commerce when
reviewing a proposed bank merger. Such a reevaluation is compelled
by the 1982 Merger Guidelines which should lead the Department of
Justice to recognize the upheaval that is currently taking place in the
financial services industry.
Tommy Leung
208. Id. at 9-10.
209. Id. at 10.
210. Id. at 11.
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